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STUDENT NoTEs
damages in such cases is peculiarly within the province of the jury,
and that the court would not set aside the verdict as excessive unless
It was plainly the result of passion or prejudice. In view of the fore-
going holdings it would seem that remittitur is improper in personal
injury cases, since a trial court abuses its discretion by setting aside
a verdict as excessive unless it is so flagrantly excessive as to appear
the result of passion or prejudice, and if the latter is present a remis-
sion will not cure the defect. However, remittitur was not in issue
in these cases.
Although the decisions of this State have settled only a few prob-
lems concerning remittitur, the following conclusions are ventured.
(a) The trial court may on its own motion without the assent of
the recovering party remit that portion of the verdict representing
separable items, the amounts of which are known or are ascertainable,
where those Items were erroneously submitted to the jury.
(b) The defendant must be granted a new trial where the verdict
is flagrantly against the evidence, or where there is proof of ample
prejudice, passion, or indifference on the part of the jury.
(c) It is uncertain whether the party liable may except to a
voluntary remittitur in a case of unliquidated damages where the court
finds no fault with the verdict except that the jury's estimate of the
damages exceeds the amount it thinks might properly have been found.
CLARENCE CORIELUS.
CONVEYANCES OF LAND IDENTIFIED BY MONUMENTS OF
APPRECIABLE WIDTH
When property is conveyed and identified by monuments of appreci-
able width, the question arises as to the particular part of the monument
that is to control. The problem is raised most frequently when the
boundary is a highway, private way, or water course, and it is the pur-
pose of this note to discuss briefly the construction to be put upon such a
conveyance in Kentucky.
In the case of Blalock, v. Atwood,' the court said that a conveyance
of land bounded on a public way carried with it the fee to the center of
such way, unless a contrary intention appeared upon the face of the
instrument or from the circumstances. The court gave the reason for
such a holding as being that the purchaser of the lot, doubtless, would
not have purchased it but for the usual benefits of the street; therefore,
'154 Ky. 39, 157 S. W. 694 (1913). Accord: City of Fordyce v.
Hampton, 179 Ark. 705, 17 S. W. (2d) 869 (1929); Bowers v. Atchison
T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 119 Kan. 202, 237 Pac. 913 (1925); Schnieder v. Jacob,
86 Ky. 101, 5 S. W. 350 (1887); Henry v. Board of Trustees of Dioceses
of Kentucky, 207 Ky. 846, 270 S. W. 476 (1925); Campeggi v. Wakefield,
157 Md. 229, 145 AtI. 546 (1929); Land v. Brooks, 241 Mich. 452, 217
N. W. 34 (1928); Hunter v. Van Kueren, 224 N. Y. Supp. 153 (1927);
Vanderbilt University v. Williams, 152 Tenn. 664, 280 S. W. 689 (1926) ;
MacCorkle v. City of Charleston, 105 W. Va. 395, 142 S. E. 841 (1935);
Spence v. Frantz, 195 Wis. 69, 217 N. W. 700 (1928).
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he paid an increased price for the lot. The usual benefits are the right
to build houses fronting on the street, with windows, doors, and door
steps that may extend beyond the line of the street, and the right to
install vaults under the sidewalk. Also if the grantor retained the prop-
erty right in the street up to the dividing line between the street and the
lot, he could deprive the grantee of the right of ingress and exit from
the street. If such were true, the grantor could deprive the grantee of
the right to light and air, to plant trees, and to erect awnings. In the
case of Schnieder v. Jacob,2 the court gave as the reason for such a hold-
ing in regard to highways that it is against public policy to allow hostile
landowners to own the small strips of land that would be created upon
the abandonment of a highway.
The real question involved is whether or not there has been suffi-
cient expression of intention to exclude the highway or street on the
part of the grantor,3 as the instrument is construed in favoV of the
grantee.4 In the Schniedet case the court held that where the deed
described the land as bounded on a street and made reference to a plat,
the conveyance carried with it the fee to the center of the highway.
In the case of Jacob et al. v. Woolford, the court held that a conveyance
of land described by metes and bounds and being bounded by a highway
carried with it the fee to said highway although no mention was made
of the highway. The BlalockT case held that a conveyance of land
described as bounded "on", "by", or "as running along" a highway will
convey the land to the center of the way. This is true even though the
length of the side boundary lines as given would carry them only to the
side of the highway 8 There is dictum in the BlalocV case which tends
to show that Kentucky would follow the majority ruling in holding that
a conveyance in which the land is described by the use of the words
"side", "margin", or "edge" of the highway carries only to the side of
the highway?° There are no cases in Kentucky in which there is a
direct holding concerning land conveyed and described by a monument
2 86 Ky. 101, 5 S. W. 350 (1887). See cases cited in note I supra.
Schnieder v. Jacob, 86 Ky. 101, 5 S. W. 350 (1887); Henry v. Board
of Trustees of Dioceses of Kentucky, 207 Ky. 846, 270 S. W. 476 (1925).
4 In Re Ladue, 118 N. Y. 215, 23 N. E. 465 (1890).
r86 Ky. 101, 5 S. W. 350 (1887). Majority in accord: City of
Fordyce v. Hampton, 179 Ark. 705, 17 S. W. (2d) 86% (1929); Anderson
v. Citizens' Savings and Trust Co., 185 Cal. 386, 197 Fac. 113 (1921);
Jarstad v. Morgan, 48 Wis. 245, 4 N. W. 27 (1880); National Bank of
Tacoma v. Johnson, 137 Wash. 452, 241 Pac. 458 (1926); Tiffany, Out-
lines of Real Property (1929) 423, Sec. 344.
8 90 Ky. 426, 14 S. W. 415 (1890). Accord: McGee v. Swearengen,
109 S. W. (2d) 444 (Ark. 1937); City of Salem v. Salem Gas and Light
Company, 241 Mass. 438, 135 N. D. 573 (1920); Cross v. Talbot, 121 Ore-
gon 270, 254 Pac. 827 (1927).
1154 Ky. 39, 157 S. W. 694 (1913). Majority in accord: Tiffany,
Outlines of Real Property (1929) 423, Sec. 344.
Supra, note 7.
9 154 Ky. 39, 157 S. W. 694 (1913).
24 Grand Rapids and I. R. Co. v. Hiesel, 38 Mich. 62 (1878); Aigler,
Boundaries on Highways (1925) 24 Mich. Law Rev. 170.
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on the side of the highway, but it is submitted that the majority rule
giving to the grantee the fee in all the land which the grantor owns in
the highway is the better rule." The Schnieder" case also held that
where land is described as bounded by a highway which is to be laid in
the future and the plan of it is on a map or plat, the conveyance car-
ries with it the fee to the center of said planned highway.
Although it does not appear that the Kentucky court has passed on
the question of interpreting a conveyance bounded by a private way or
alley, there is nothing to indicate that it would apply a rule different
from that used in case the boundary is a highway. A majority of courts
allow a conveyance of land bounded by a private way or alley to carry
with it the fee to the center of the way, unless a contrary intention
appears. 1" This is true because the theory behind such a rule is the
same as that given in regard to land bounded by a highway.4 Possibly
the only distinction between the conveyances of lands bounded by high-
ways and those bounded by private ways is to be found where the
grantor reserves the right to use the private way; the majority of
courts hold that such a conveyance excludes the private way."
In the case of Williamsburg Boom Co. v. Smith, the court set out
the law concerning a conveyance of land bounded by tidal and non-
tidal streams as follows:
"It is the rule of the common law that the right of land owners
bounding upon tidal waters extends only to the ordinary high
water-bounding mark, and that the bed beyond it belongs to the
state, for the use of the public; but grants of land upon navigable
rivers, above tidewater, vest the soil ad fium aquae in the grantee,
unless the terms of the grant clearly show an intention to stop at
the margin of the river."
As in the case of highways, the real question involved in the conveyance
of land bounded by a stream above tidewater is whether or not there
has been sufficient expression of intention to exclude the bed of the
stream.
The Kentucky court accepts the common law definition of a navi-
gable stream, saying that a stream to be navigable must be one in which
the tide ebbs and flows. In some cases we find the court speaking of a
stream as being navigable, but it is only for a practical purpose. There
" Cattle v. Young, 59 Maine 105 (1872); Low v. Tibbetts, 72 Maine
92 (1881). But see Chadwick v. Doris, 143 Mass. 7, 8 N. E. 601 (1886);
Hunt v. Brown, 75 Md. 481, 23 Atl. 1029 (1892).
186 Ky. 101, 5 S. W. 350 (1887). Accord: Johnson v. Arnold, 91 Ga.
659, 1S S. U. 370 (1893); Thompson v. Maloney, 199 Ill. 276, 65 N. E. 236
(1902); In Re Ladue, 118 N. Y. 215, 23 N. E. 465 (1898); Anthony v.
City of Providence, 18 R. I. 699, 28 Atl. 766 (1894).
"Lemay v. Furtado, 182 Mass. 280, 65 N. E. 395 (1902); Dulce
Realty Company v. Staed Realty Company, 245 Mo. 417, 151 S. W. 415
(1901); Baker v. Barry, 22 R. I. 471, 48 Atl. 795 (1901); 9 C. J. 205,
note 49.
" See notes 1 and 13 supra.
" 9 C. J. 205, note 51.
.184 Ky. 372, 1 S. W. 765 (1386).
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are no navigable streams within the common law definition in Ken-
tucky. Thus in Kentucky the conveyance of land bounded by a natural
stream is presumed to carry with it the fee to the center of the bed of
the stream. Kentucky is in accord with the majority of courts in allow-
ing a conveyance of land bounded on a natural non-navigable stream
to carry with it the fee to the center of the bed of the stream, but it is a
small minority in following the common law definition of a navigable
stream. 7 The great majority of courts repudiate the old common law
definition and declare a stream navigable if it is navigable in fact and
exclude the bed of such stream from private ownership. 8
The Kentucky court has held that where a conveyance called for
the "Cumberland river and its meanders", the deed carried with it the
fee to the thread of the stream? A similar conclusion was reached
where trees and monuments on the bank of the river were called for in
the river line description." In all of the cases regarding land bounded
by natural streams, the deed called for monuments on the bank or the
meanders of the stream.
Because Kentucky owns the Ohio river to the north bank, the Ken-
tucky court has a rather unusual rule with regard to conveyances
bounded by that river. In the case of City of Covington v. State Tax
Commissioner et al,2 .the court held that a conveyance of land bounded
on the Ohio river, nothing appearing in the deed to the contrary, carried
with it the fee to the center of the stream. Thus, even though the state
owns to the far shore, the riparian owner takes only to the thread of
the stream.
A Kentucky case has not come to the attention of the writer in
regard to conveyances of land bounded by artificial bodies of water.
The majority of courts hold that in a deed of land bounded by an arti-
ficial pond," canal," ditch,24 or mill race" the deed carries with it the
fee to all the land owned by the grantee, unless a contrary intention
appears on the face of the instrument.
"I Berry v. Snyder, 66 Ky. 266 (1867); Miller v. Hepburn, 71 Ky. 326
(1871); Williamsburg Boom Co. v. Smith, 84 Ky. 372, 1 S. W. 765
(1886); Huffman v. Charles et al., 97 S. W. 77.5 (Ky. 1906); Reichert v.
Ellis Ferry Co., 184 Ky. 150, 211 S. W. 403 (1919); Jenkins v. Sadler,
et al., 212 Ky. 581, 279 S. W. 982 (1926); City of Covington v. State
Tax Commissioner et al., 231 Ky. 606, 21 S. W. (2d) 1010 (1929); Tif-
fany, Outlines of Real Property (1929) 421, Sec. 343.
"Cooley v. Golden, 117 Mo. 33, 23 S. W. 100 (1893); Kinkead v.
Turgeon, 74 Nebr. 573, 104 N. W. 1061 (1905); Tiffany, Outlines of Real
Propertg (1929) 422, Sec. 343.
"9 Williamsburg Boom Co. v. Smith, 84 Ky. 372, 1 S. W. 765 (1886).
'Reichert v. Ellis Ferry Co., 184 Ky. 150, 211 S. W. 403 (1919);
Herndon v. Smith, 211 Ky. 91, 276 S. W. 1081 (1925).
- 231 Ky. 606, 21 S. W. (2d) 1010 (1929).
29 C. J. 191, note 31.
"9 C. J. 191, note 27.
1 Ibid.
23Ibid.
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In summary, it is submitted that in the conveyance of land bounded
by a highway, street, private way, natural non-tidal streams, or artifi-
cial ponds, canals, ditches, and mill races the conveyance carries with
It the fee to the center of such way or body of water, unless a contrary
Intention appears.
J. GRnwv= CiAxK
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